Critiquing Imperialism

Critiquing Imperialism © Anup Mukherjee

Niall Ferguson’s essay (April 2003 Historically Speaking) grafts the globalization of current times onto that of the British Empire and finds a non-contextual resemblance between the International Monetary Fund’s prescriptions and late 19th- and early 20thcentury British economic policy. Yet Ferguson skillfully avoids the fact that too often Britain acted as a protectionist nation vis-à-vis its colonies. John A. Hobson wrote in Imperialism: A Study (1902): “Imperialism repudiates Free Trade, and rests upon an economic basis of Protection.” Moreover, Britain’s trade with its colonies as a proportion of its trade with other countries in the latter half of the 19th century either remained stagnant or declined, which clearly contradicts Ferguson’s “unequivocal” claim that the “policy of free trade was beneficial . . . to her colonies.”

With regard to the issue of “unprecedented” overseas investment, Ferguson neglects to mention that shares in the “immense” Indian railways came with a 5% sovereign-guaranteed return. British capital investment in India was small, and excluding the guaranteed investments in railways and public debt, negligible.

Ferguson cannot explain why imperial Britain’s IMF-style policies did not lead to economic growth, while similar policies have doubled India’s growth rate in the past decade. Perhaps the “autarky” after independence should be reevaluated, and not just dismissed as “wrong conclusions” arrived at by the nationalists.

Left to their own devices, countries like India could have gone the Japanese route. Despite its handicaps - many of them direct consequences of imperialism - India has made great strides in areas like nuclear and space technology, and this after only fifty years of independence.

[The following is the complete essay, an abstract of which was published as letter to the editor in Historically Speaking as already cited above. - Anup Mukherjee]

The Forum articles on “The British Empire And Globalization” were very interesting. However after reading the write-ups, I was reminded of Alan Nevins remark, “The entire vitality and interest of history depend upon the fact that universally acceptable summaries are impossible…a great part of the these [historical] problems can never be settled. Some are insoluble because they are too vast and complex… Others are insoluble because of the loss or suppression of historical evidence…” [1] Strangely enough, as it may seem, most of the (acknowledged) Histories written of the colonial period is based on the perspective and documents of the imperial records- the view of the native is either non-existent or considered too peripheral to attract recognition. Niall Ferguson’s write-up uses sweeping macro facts that tends to see the world in purely economic terms of growth rates etc (and mostly for twentieth century) and ignoring various underlying causal factors that went into British Imperialism.

Lets consider some theoretical aspects first.

An Empire is not ipso facto justification of itself. It is a moral question that Historians should ask, whether freedom and liberty of a nation is an ideal worth cherishing for human societies, or an empire of a nation-state enveloping others is desirable. Where the lines of balance actually get drawn are facts of History. Deriving from it is the question whether a nation is more efficient or an empire. This requires multidimensional analysis. Economic analysis is only one aspect of such analysis and pretty insufficient in understanding political, social and cultural aspirations.

Political theorists of past have eulogised the ideals of city-states to that of nation states. The state deriving from contract has attracted philosophers, and revolutions for national liberty have inspired generations. At the same time, the historic process has seen emergence and decline of empires. Creation and fragmentation of empires has been a continuous process till late twentieth century - whether it be actual territorial control or spheres of influences. Except for rhetoric, there exists no justification that political empires are desirable. Whether they are efficient from economic point or if beneficial, then to whom are further debatable question. Such issues get compounded in issues of imperialism where economic motivations take up disproportionate considerations. This is fairly clear whether it be the British Empire or the alleged American Empire. Political and military intervention brings about disproportionate economic windfalls compared to rule based free trade or free market regimes. Powerful nations are too impatient to earn their profit by mere trade and investment or other instruments of civil society.

Also useful to consider are some dimensions of our debates on imperialism.

One, Imperial-colonial encounter is often seen in terms of either-or. The defenders of imperialism would tend to see good things and ignore the ugly dimensions, while those opposed to imperialism would see everything imperial as despicable. However the validity of such assertions tends to become rhetorical in form of eurocentrism or third-world nationalism. This becomes particularly nasty when the Historian manipulates the data as a skilful statistician to marshal their arguments.

Two, when these colonial nations gain independence, it is expected that there would be sudden dramatic positive improvement in various parameters compared to the colonial times. This is at best optimism. Any nation that undergoes rapid political transformation and its consequent social and economic adjustments would often lead to dips for short or longer durations. The long years of colonization would have anyway taken away the vitality while creating vested interests. These would jeopardize the smoothness of political and economic developments.

Three, it is taken as an axiom that technology is non-political, and transformation of scientific know-how and its conversion to deployable technology is politically neutral. This is hardly the case. In reality, technology is tightly bound to the political interests and is a vital instrument of the imperial toolbox.

Four, the statement that Ferguson makes - “…given that the British imposed superior economic institutions wherever they ruled…” This is a dimension of mythic assertion. What are the criteria that one set of economic institutions are superior? The scientific ethics as developed by Adolf Wagner and Gustav Schmoller seems more convincing than orthodox economics. While orthodox Economics seems ahistorical as it would hold true even in absence of state- as it requires only individuals who exchange commodities, in reality every economic institution is a product of the customary and legal regulations specific to the society. If Ferguson is dogmatic on his assertion, then his view is anti-plural verging on economic fascism that sees only the British model as worth emulating and everything else as inferior. Moreover from the colonial perspective the economic institutions that the British (and other imperialists) created were nothing short of being exploitative for the colonies.

Five, Ferguson’s article puts the wheel backward by using the globalization of current times to juxtapose it on the British Empire, and seemingly making Angloglobalization a driving force towards globalization of those times, and strangely he finds a simple non-contextual correlation of IMF prescriptions to British Economic Policy. However, he has skilfully avoided the fact that too often British itself acted as a protectionist nation vis-à-vis its colonies. John A. Hobson wrote in Imperialism: A Study (1902) “Imperialism repudiates Free Trade, and rests upon an economic basis of Protection", and also spoke of the increasing military and naval expenditure of Britain since 1884 as insurance premium for protection. Moreover, Britain’s trade with its colonies as a proportion vis-à-vis its trade with other countries in the latter half of the nineteenth century either remained stagnant or declined, which clearly contradicts Ferguson’s ‘unequivocal’ claim that ‘policy of free trade was beneficial…to her colonies’. At political level, as Hobson states, there was no representative or responsible institution in any of the thirty-nine separate areas annexed by British since 1870 - this again for the ‘liberal imperialism’ of Ferguson. Today’s America seems to fair much better.

Interesting to note that for Ferguson the ‘astounding’ result of Angloglobalization was free trade, mass migration, and ‘unprecedented’ overseas investment. The British infact monopolized trade and acted as a disincentive to free trade by coercing the natives to trade through the British. This comes out stark in Bengal in the mid eighteenth century. He has skilfully left out the dimension of slavery indulged in by the East India Co particularly in Madagascar, and considers the movement of semi-slave indentured labourers (to Fiji, Caribbean etc) as positive dimension of ‘international mobility of labour’; it is a matter to ponder if these were part of the British ’superior economic institutions’. To the issue of ‘unprecedented’ overseas investment, take the case of the ‘immense’ railways in India, Ferguson misses the point completely by suggesting as if the investment was open ended. In reality, this investment came with 5% sovereign-guaranteed return by government of British India - “…it was immaterial to [the investor] whether the funds that he lent were thrown into the Hooghly or converted into brick and mortar….the East India Railway cost…are the most extravagant works that were ever undertaken” [2]. Even taking into account the foreign investment in totality, the British capital investment in India was small, and excluding the guaranteed investments in railways and public debt, negligible - “the foreign-owned capital in India was not imported from Britain but was generated within India and that India was throughout this period a net exporter of capital” [3]

Ferguson devotes a considerable portion to India, and dismisses the Nationalist view of Drain of Wealth and bases himself on Tirthankar Roy. Despite this, Ferguson is not clear why the IMF style policies of Britain did not lead to economic growth of the colony, while similar policies have doubled the growth rate in the past decade in India. It is perhaps here that the ‘autarky’ after independence should be re-evaluated, and not just dismissed as ‘wrong conclusions’ by the nationalists. Also strangely enough, for him the Bengal famine of 1943 arose ‘because improvements introduced under British rule collapsed under the strain of war’! A much better perspective on the Bengal Famine can be found in Amartya Sen’s Poverty and Famines, where the eminent economist has devoted a whole chapter to the issue. Moreover, during colonial times, in India, the issue was a choice between railways and irrigation- the former was promoted at the cost of the latter which further aggravated the situation. The ‘distinctly positive effects’ of Ferguson worked otherwise - India lost its share in world trade and the economy stagnated- whether it be agriculture, industry or trade. In education Macaulay’s objective of creating “a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect” (minutes of education 2-2-1835) not only created a set of miniscule sub-elites, the education system introduced by British itself was devoid of scientific content, and merely supplanted the traditional education by the western generalist education.

In the field of technology, the indigenous ships that was comparable to the British ships was stymied - not by the western technology, but by the Registry Act of 1815. This was prior to the emergence of steam ships. The technologies introduced by British were no benevolence, but perhaps a necessity if they wished to keep the huge empire under their control - technology remained political instrument of control - perhaps a reason why a small number of British were able to have control over the vast Indian territory. This was apart from the ideological orientation of being governed by an invincible imperialist that was accepted by the patient and illiterate masses.

The non-economic variables like Court of Law were instruments of suppression and visible racism as indicated by the Ilbert Bill controversy. Also, the Missionaries and their supporters were openly insulting to the indigenous religions. To just put some samples- for Charles Grant Hinduism was ‘…rabble of impure deities…[with] ridiculous ceremonies and degrading superstitions…’; William Wilberforce would declare in Parliament, ‘Our religion is sublime, pure and beneficient. Theirs is mean, licentious and cruel’; for Carey, Hindus had ‘completely surrendered their reason’; and for Alexander Duff Indians were, ‘multiple of heathens, the most licentious and depraved under the sun’, and in his book India and Indian Missions, he remarked, ‘ of all the systems of false religions ever fabricated by the perverse ingenuity of fallen men, Hinduism is surely the most stupendous’ [4] Moreover the British imperialists sowed the seeds of separation between Hindus and Muslims in the subcontinent. The imperialism even affected the women adversely as has been shown by Veena Oldenburg in her book Dowry Murder - The Imperial Origins of a Cultural Crime in which her research of colonial Punjab finds that such murders did not have cultural roots, but can be traced to British imperialism that created massive economic and social destabilization. In this regard, Robert E. Lucas Jr. is right that imperialism was opposite of liberalism, and also that the economics of imperialism of Ferguson is not convincing. The wrap of liberalism in form of the imperial civilizing mission can hardly justify its own role in the imperial enterprise.

To the issue of global competitiveness, once a country has gone behind in the race due to its being a colony, it becomes really difficult to make a comeback too soon. In this regard, two things are pertinent - firstly, the impoverishment of colonies directly subsidised the emerging economy of the industrialising Britain during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. If this subsidization of British economy did not take place through its colonies, the fast pace of industrialization would not have occurred in Britain as well, as the colonial markets would not have been available for imperial goods during early periods of industrialization. Secondly, if left to itself, countries like India could have gone the Japanese (or other European country) way, where industrialization came, even if somewhat late. This is exemplified by the fact that despite all its handicaps, India has been able to reach technological self-reliance in areas like nuclear and space technology, despite denial of technology by the West, in mere fifty years of independence.

In the contemporary context Andrew J. Bacevich suggests that America is a sort of successor to the imperial Britain- that Pax Americana is now the reality that one needs to contend with, even if the British model might not be an appropriate role model for it. Along with his critical outlook on the American Empire, in this article he considers that ‘providence has charged America with the salvation of the world’. This is a sentiment that is often displayed by nations that have become powerful - the language of philanthropy in imperial statecraft tends to lessen the guilt of the mighty. For Americans this is nothing new. Such sentiments displayed since long by literatures like Walt Whitman, Herman Melville etc. comes naturally to today’s policy makers. However, it is equally true that the future of America and its alleged Empire is a politicised issue, with large number of literature that see American role in contrasting way. One set would see America as a great power with a mission, while others are neither happy with such prospect nor wish to see such role for their country.

Large number of responsible Americans, well aware of power exerted by their country, would not like to see America go the British way- nor would they like to take the world as the twenty-first century ‘white mans burden’. Despite Iraq and despite the National Security Strategy, values like democracy and free market are no more moral monopolies of the West, whose alibis it can use to intervene. Some nations might be totalitarian as Iraq, and some leaders might be stupid as Saddam, but not all, not everywhere. It is here that the apologists of America’s Global Leadership particularly in the twenty-first century should take lessons from other empires of past. No empire lasts forever - and when an empire comes to demise, the spearheading nation also comes to a long-term decline. Not without reason, the political discourse regarding nature of America and its role in the world has been hotly debated whether it be cold war, post cold war or post 9/11. Here its instructive of what Hobson wrote, “Not only does aggressive Imperialism defeat the movement towards internationalism by fostering animosities among competing empires: its attack upon the liberties and the existence of weaker or lower races stimulates in them a corresponding excess of national self-consciousness.” [5] Today there may not be competing empires, but certainly there are competing nations who would hardly like to get dominated in a world order of self-proclaimed US unilateralism. And today the assertion of self-identity is much stronger than ever before in different parts of the world.

Despite the end of balance of two and today’s unilateralism, I think the world is moving towards a balance of many; eventhough the world would have to do with the ‘global leadership’ of USA for some time to come - but never can USA afford to emulate the model on which the sun never set.

Notes:

[1] Allan Nevins (1938), The Gateway of History, p. 228-29, (Bombay: Vora & Co., 1968)

[2] William N. Massey, Finance Minister of India under Lawrence and Mayo quoted in R.C. Dutt, The Economic History of India, Vol 2, p, 248 (Publications Division)

[3] Bipin Chandra, Nationalism and Colonilaism in Modern India, p. 98 (Orient Longman, 1979)

[4] All quotes from Tara Chand, History of Freedom Movement in India Vol 2, p. 238-240 (Publications Division)

[5] John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, (1902) Introductory chapter - Nationalism and Imperialism